



**The National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia
Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional RI (Lemhannas RI)**

**Steering Committee
THE 10TH JAKARTA GEOPOLITICAL FORUM**



**“STRENGTHENING MULTILATERALISM:
SURVIVAL AMID GLOBAL TURBULENCE
AND A FRAGMENTED WORLD”**

Jakarta, 9 July 2026

Term of Reference
**“Strengthening Multilateralism:
Survival Amid Global Turbulence and a Fragmented World”**

A. Background

Global fragmentation in the past decade has demonstrated a fundamental shift from a relatively open and integrated international order to a more polarised configuration based on strategic interests. While the post-Cold War era was characterised by the dominance of economic liberalism and multilateralism, contemporary dynamics demonstrate the emergence of a more complex multipolarity. At the same time, multilateralism is increasingly threatened and tends to be abandoned, as major powers prefer unilateral approaches or limited coalitions, perceived as more effective in protecting their strategic interests.

Major powers such as the United States, China, and Russia compete to expand their geopolitical influence through classical realist strategies, including balance of power, flexible alliances, power projection, and foreign policy pragmatism that places national interests above universal norms. In this context, middle-power and developing countries are increasingly adopting adaptive hedging and non-alignment strategies to maintain strategic autonomy amidst the growing intensity of great-power competition.

In the field of technology, global fragmentation is reinforced by competitive strategies over the control of advanced technologies. The rivalry between the United States and China has triggered what is often referred to as a chip war, marked by restriction on advanced semiconductor exports, supply chain control, and domestic industrial subsidies. This competition extends to the development of artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and the dominance of global digital infrastructure. At the same time, outer space has become a new strategic domain, with the increasing launch of communication, navigation, and remote sensing satellites for both military and economic purposes. Technological fragmentation not only creates competing standards and digital ecosystems but also has the potential to divide the global internet into separate technological blocs.

From an economic perspective, fragmentation is reflected in the reconstruction of global supply chains in response to geopolitical tensions, the pandemic, and national security risks. Practices such as friend-shoring, near-shoring, and production diversification are carried out to reduce reliance on a single country or region. Energy competition is also intensifying as the transition to clean energy and mineral demand becomes critical, while geopolitical conflicts impact the stability of oil and gas supplies. In addition, the trend of de-dollarisation through the use of local currencies in bilateral trade and the strengthening of alternative payment systems reflects efforts to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar-based financial system. Increasing tariffs and protectionist policies across various countries further signal a shift from efficient globalisation toward security-oriented globalisation.

Analytically, global fragmentation is the result of interaction between power dynamics, systemic disruption, and technological transformation, which are reshaping the structure of international power distribution. The realist approach explains the tendency of states to prioritise security and sovereignty strategies, while pragmatism leads to flexible and interest-based policies. The emerging multipolarity is not merely a more dispersed distribution of power, but also creates competition over norms, technological standards, and global economic architectures. In this context, fragmentation does not mean total deglobalisation, but rather a reconfiguration of globalisation into more selective, secure, and strategic blocs. This phenomenon shapes an increasingly complex, uncertain, and competitive international environment, requiring countries to develop adaptive strategies to maintain national resilience and sustainable development.

B. Strategic objectives and scope of the forum

Since its initiation in 2017, the Jakarta Geopolitical Forum aims to serve as a forum for geopolitical experts, professionals, and academics to exchange thoughts, ideas, and experiences in geopolitics and related areas such as geo-economics and geo-technology. This forum seeks to foster collaboration among countries and diverse national stakeholders in solving the following concerns.

1. The Decline of Multilateralism

Contemporary geopolitical fragmentation presents a gradual erosion of multilateralism, which for decades has been a pillar of global governance. International institutions that emerged from the post-World War II architecture, particularly the United Nations, struggle with limited effectiveness due to major power competition and the politicisation of decision-making mechanisms. The UN Security Council, for example, frequently faces deadlocks due to the exercise of veto power by permanent member states, resulting in delays or the absence of firm collective action in resolving armed conflicts and violations of international law. This situation reflects the weakening of collective norms and the increasing preference of states for unilateral approaches or ad hoc consensus.

The dominance of superpowers remains the primary determinant in global dynamics. The United States continues to maintain its global military and financial supremacy, while China consolidates its economic and technological influence, and Russia asserts its military and geopolitical strength in strategic domains. This competition encourages political practices that prioritise national security interests over normative commitments to international law. Military interventions without a clear multilateral mandate, territorial annexations, and the use of unilateral economic sanctions reflect the tendency of powerful states to interpret or even disregard international legal norms when they conflict with their strategic interests.

The decline of multilateralism is also evident in the weakening of arms control regimes, the intensification of military competition, and the normalisation of the use of force in conflict resolution. When international legal mechanisms are no longer the primary reference, the legitimacy of the international system risks being eroded and replaced by a power-based order. In this context, middle and smaller states face a strategic dilemma: to maintain commitment to multilateral norms that are weakening, or to adapt to the increasingly dominant logic of power. These developments emphasise that the crisis of multilateralism is not merely an

institutional issue, but a reflection of the redistribution of global power and a shift of international security paradigms.

2. The Shift Toward Strategic Protectionism

The current global economic fragmentation reflects a shift from market efficiency toward a logic of security and national resilience, driven by global economic disparities and rivalry among major powers. The reconstruction of supply chains and production diversification are not merely risk mitigation strategies, but also geopolitical instruments to reduce dependence on rival states and strengthen politically aligned economic blocs. Developed countries seek to relocate strategic production bases to trusted partners, while developing countries face pressure to adjust standards, industrial policies, and trade orientations to remain integrated in global production networks.

Energy competition is deepening this fragmentation. The transition to clean energy increases demand for critical minerals such as nickel, lithium, and cobalt, creating new competition over resource access and control of energy technology value chains. At the same time, geopolitical tensions and regional conflicts continue to affect the stability of oil and gas supplies, turning energy into a tool of political and economic leverage. Major powers utilise sanctions, energy embargoes, and technology controls to maintain and expand their influence, making global energy markets increasingly politicised.

The trend of de-dollarisation and the use of local currencies in bilateral trade reflects efforts by several countries to reduce vulnerability to the U.S.-centered global financial system. The dominance of the dollar in international payments allows Washington to impose far-reaching financial sanctions, prompting other countries to develop alternative payment mechanisms and strengthen regional financial cooperation. However, fragmentation of the financial system may increase transaction costs, reduce transparency, and create competing monetary blocs.

Rising tariffs, industrial subsidies, and protectionist policies across countries indicate that global trade is increasingly shaped by economic competition and efforts to protect domestic industries. Major powers use trade instruments as tools of strategic pressure, while economic capacity disparities make developing countries vulnerable to discriminatory trade standards and global market volatility. Thus, economic fragmentation is not merely a response to a crisis, but a reflection of structural contestation within the international economic system, where major powers seek to maintain dominance, while other nations struggle to preserve economic sovereignty and development space.

3. The Global Technology Competition

Global technological fragmentation has now evolved into a strategic arena of competition that not only determines economic superiority, but also security supremacy and geopolitical influence. The rivalry between the United States and China in the semiconductor sector reflects a systematic effort to control the backbone of the digital economy and modern weapons systems. Restrictions on high-tech chip exports, investment controls, and domestic industrial subsidies indicate a shift from free markets toward interstate technological competition. In this context, the chip war is not merely about maintaining markets but also a strategy to limit the technological capabilities of adversaries and an effort to preserve domestic digital sovereignty.

This competition extends to the development of artificial intelligence, computing, and global digital infrastructure, which has the potential to create new forms of power among states. AI has become a force multiplier that can enhance intelligence capabilities, autonomous weapons systems, cyber operations, and large-scale information manipulation. The integration of AI into military and security systems has the potential to accelerate wartime decision-making cycles, reduce human control, and increase the risk of unintended conflict escalation. At the same time, the dominance of digital platforms and technological standards can result in technological blocs that fragment data ecosystems, networks, and internet governance, thereby eroding global interoperability.

Countries with large productive-age populations have the potential to benefit from a demographic dividend through job creation in technology sectors, advanced manufacturing, and the digital economy. However, AI- and robotics-based automation also has the potential to replace low- and medium-skilled jobs, widen skill gaps, and require massive reskilling and upskilling. Thus, technology becomes a determining factor in whether the demographic dividend will lead to inclusive growth or instead increase structural poverty.

On the other hand, the expansion of the digital economy and data-based integrated systems creates new vulnerabilities to increasingly complex cyber threats. Critical infrastructure such as energy systems, banking, transportation, and communications now depend on digital networks that are vulnerable to cyberattacks, data sabotage, and technological espionage. The use of AI in cyber operations enables more precise, automated, and difficult-to-detect attacks, including information manipulation, data theft strategies, and disruption of defence systems. For developing and middle-income countries, these vulnerabilities are exacerbated by limited cybersecurity capacity and dependence on foreign technology.

Outer space has also emerged as a new strategic frontier, marked by the proliferation of satellite communications, navigation, and remote sensing that are crucial for the digital economy, global logistics, and precision military operations. Reliance on orbital infrastructure creates new vulnerabilities, including the potential for anti-satellite attacks and disruptions to global navigation systems. This technological disruption signals a shift from conventional competition toward innovation-based competition and data dominance. In the long term, without an effective global governance framework, technological rivalry risks deepening fragmentation in the international system, widening the digital divide, and opening space for AI ecosystems to reshape the nature of conflict and global stability in the future.

C. Strategic Issues

The 10th Jakarta Geopolitical Forum is a strategic platform for deep discussion of various interconnected contemporary geopolitical, geoeconomics, and geo-technology issues, with the main theme of "**Strengthening Multilateralism: Survival Amid Global Turbulence and a Fragmented World.**" The forum is designed to explore critical thinking, provide cross-states perspectives, and formulate applicable policy recommendations in addressing increasingly complex global challenges. To ensure the depth of discussions and richness of perspectives, each sub-topic will be

discussed by four speakers from different countries, including academics, diplomats, practitioners, and senior policymakers.

1. Opening Keynote and First Plenary Session

The Decline of Multilateralism in the Multipolar Era: Super Power Dominance and Challenges to International Norms

Speakers:

a) **Keynote:** Mr. Sugiono

Foreign Minister of The Republic of Indonesia

"Strategic Adaptation and Opportunities in The Weakening of Multilateralism and Era of Power Competition"

Subtopic of discussion:

- Indonesia has long run a "bebas aktif" (independent and active) foreign policy, and it has now joined BRICS as a full member while also pursuing OECD accession. Critics read this as aligning in every direction at once. How does the Minister keep that flexibility from sliding into strategic ambiguity that the major powers can exploit, and where exactly is the line Indonesia will not cross or its limit?
- Where do you see the most consequential erosion of multilateral norms in the past five years (in trade, security, or climate) and what should Indonesia's reform agenda look like as a G20 and BRICS member simultaneously?
- This session frames the weakening of multilateralism as carrying "opportunities," yet for most states a fragmenting order is mainly a threat. What concrete opportunities does Indonesia actually see, and how does the Minister answer the view that calling fragmentation an opportunity is really damage control reframed as agency?

b) Prof. Nick Bisley

Pro Vice-Chancellor for Research and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe University; the Australian Member Committee Co-Chair of the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.

"Beyond Great Powers: Middle Powers and the Future of Multilateral Cooperation"

Subtopic of discussion:

- Middle powers have historically championed rules-based multilateral order. Yet many are now active participants in minilateral formats that route around multilateral institutions rather than strengthening them. Does participation in these arrangements reflect pragmatic adaptation, or does it progressively hollow out the multilateral architecture middle powers claim to defend?
- Middle-power cooperation (MIKTA, IBSA, etc.) has struggled because member states have divergent domestic priorities and electoral cycles. What is the minimum institutional architecture required for middle powers to act collectively rather than episodically?
- CSCAP and track-two diplomacy were built for a more cooperative period. With mistrust between the major powers now running high, is track two still a space for genuine problem solving, or has it mostly become a channel for signalling and managing expectations? What would make it more consequential? What distinguishes a middle-power

coalition that genuinely shapes outcomes from one that merely issues joint communiqués?

c) Prof. Dr. Georgy Toloraya

National Coordinator for Council for Security Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific; Executive Director (the lead operational and research executive) of the National Committee on BRICS Research - Russia

“Navigating Peace and Stability in The Dominance of Major Global Powers in Interstate Competition”

Subtopic of discussion:

- How does Russia’s perspective in the evolving China–Russia partnership in the context of a multipolar order; strategic convergence with shared long-term civilisational goals, or a tactical alignment driven primarily by mutual antagonism toward the West? What does each side fundamentally seek from the other, and where do their interests structurally diverge (particularly in Central Asia and the Arctic, or technology transfer)? What areas of convergence and divergence are most relevant for Asian and Indo-Pacific stability?
- Russia frequently advocates a "multipolar world order," yet the operationalisations of multipolarity remains contested. How does Russia view the role of ASEAN, India, and other Indo-Pacific middle powers in this emerging order (as autonomous poles, swing states, or peripheral actors) and what concrete avenues for cooperation does Russia see with Southeast Asia beyond defence sales and energy exports?
- Do non-Western institutions like BRICS+ and the SCO function as alternatives to, or supplements to, the current system (UN and Bretton Woods); to what extent can BRICS+, the SCO, and other non-Western platforms complement existing multilateral institutions in reducing strategic mistrust and preventing great-power escalation?

d) Prof. Hikmahanto Juwana

International Law Professor, Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia

“From Fragility to Resilience: Revitalising International Legal Order in an Era of Strategic Ambiguity”

Subtopic of discussion:

- Nearly a decade after the 2016 PCA Arbitral Tribunal ruling on the South China Sea, the persistent gap between legal victory and enforceable outcomes has become a defining test case for the international legal order. What has this experience taught us about the limits of international law when confronted with great-power non-compliance, and what should smaller claimant states do differently?
- In an era of deliberate "strategic ambiguity", where states exploit legal grey zones through maritime militia, grey-zone operations, and lawfare; how should ASEAN approach the long-stalled Code of Conduct on the South China Sea to make it genuinely binding rather than aspirational? What specific provisions are non-negotiable for a meaningful agreement? What concrete legal innovations can ASEAN develop to close these gaps without provoking escalation?
- What realistic coalition-building pathway exists when even existing regimes (WTO, ICC, arms control) are eroding? How can regional legal cooperation complement the existing international legal order, especially when global enforcement mechanisms remain weak?

Moderator : Dr. Philips J. Vermonte

2. Second Plenary Session: “The Shift Toward Strategic Protectionism: Power Competition Across Green Energy, Financial Systems and International Trade”

Speakers:

a) **Keynote:** Dyah Roro Esti Widya Putri

Vice Minister of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia

“Rebalancing Power Through Trade: Tariffs and Strategic Competition in an Era of Economic Slowdown”

Subtopic of discussion:

- What are the best strategic responses for middle power countries like Indonesia in navigating this crisis of multilateralism and geoeconomics fragmentation? How Indonesia makes a stance position about the current role of international agencies related with economy such as WTO, IMF, World Bank? The weaponization of tariffs, secondary sanctions, and export controls on critical technologies disproportionately affects emerging economies. What specific defensive mechanisms should middle-income countries prioritise in the next 3–5 years, and what role should Indonesia play in coordinating such efforts within ASEAN and BRICS?
- How to mitigate the negative impact of Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) on Indonesian economy? Indonesia currently facing the Investigation 301 from US Trade Act 1974, what is the best response for Indonesia meanwhile some our peer countries was not so responsive to this investigation? How to get the coordination better between stakeholder (especially Penta helix coordination) in Indonesia to have the same vision/goal in international economic diplomacy and negotiation?
- The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism has been effectively paralysed since the Appellate Body crisis of 2019, and major powers increasingly use tariffs as instruments of geopolitical signalling. What practical alternatives are emerging (plurilateral agreements, deepened FTAs, regional frameworks like RCEP and CPTPP) and can they substitute for genuine multilateral trade governance, or do they accelerate fragmentation? What realistic dispute-resolution pathway exists for Indonesia during this transitional period?

b) Shaokai Fan

Head of Asia-Pacific, Global Head of Central Bank, World Gold Council

“Currency Competition in Transition: De-dollarisation, Gold, Digital Money, and the Future of Global Trade and Regional Cooperation”

Subtopic of discussion:

- Central bank gold purchases have reached record highs, driven largely by non-Western buyers. Is this a structural shift toward gold-anchored reserve practices, or a tactical hedge that will reverse when geopolitical risk subsides?
- The proliferation of CBDCs, cross-border payment systems (mBridge, BRICS Pay, ASEAN QR linkage), and bilateral currency swap agreements suggests a multi-currency future. Realistically, what could

plausibly replace dollar dominance in trade settlement and reserve holdings over a 10–15-year horizon, or will dollar hegemony persist by default given network effects and the absence of credible alternatives? How about the future of digital money?

- For emerging economy, what is the optimal portfolio balance between gold reserves, regional currency arrangements (Local Currency Settlement Framework), and traditional dollar and euro holdings? How should monetary cooperation deepen in response to the weaponization of finance, without provoking destabilising capital flows?

c) Arief Wijaya

Managing Director World Resources Institute (WRI) Indonesia

“Advancing a Sustainable Green Economy: Cooperation, Strategic Resources, and the Future of Industrial Transformation”

Subtopic of discussion:

- Many governments now present domestic subsidies and industrial policy as essential to accelerating the energy transition, yet the same measures are increasingly aimed at securing advantage over rivals. From your perspective, where does mutually reinforcing cooperation end and zero-sum competition begin in green industrial policy, and is the current trajectory expanding the global supply of clean technology or fragmenting it into parallel, duplicative systems?
- Processing and refining of many critical minerals remains concentrated in a small number of countries, and several resource rich economies are now using export restrictions or downstreaming requirements to move up the value chain. What conditions actually determine whether such measures produce durable industrial transformation rather than new dependencies or trade disputes, and how should a country weigh the tension between asserting sovereign control over its resources and the cooperative arrangements the transition is said to require?
- Instruments such as carbon border measures and local content requirements are presented as climate or industrial tools, but in practice they operate as conditions on market access that fall unevenly across economies at different stages of development. How can the rules governing the green economy avoid hardening into competing blocs or shifting adjustment costs onto developing exporters, and who, in your view, should set those rules given the limited authority of existing multilateral bodies over this space?

d) Ben Lawson

Energy, Mining & Business Development Expert, Vice Chairman of Djakarta Mining Club

“Reconfiguring Regional Supply Chains and Logistics: Diversification, Intra-Regional Trade, and Economic Resilience”

Subtopic of discussion:

- The 2020–2025 disruptions exposed acute fragility in global supply chains. From a practitioner standpoint, what are the realistic limits of supply chain diversification, what genuinely can be near-shored or friend-shored in the energy and mining sectors, and what cannot, due to capital intensity, geological constraints, or scale economics?
- The global race for critical minerals (nickel, cobalt, copper, lithium, rare earths) is reshaping geo-economics and creating new dependencies.

How can resource-rich developing economies capture downstream value beyond raw extraction without being captured by either Chinese or Western technology blocs? Where do you see the genuine opportunities for emerging economies in Southeast Asia in supply-chain diversification beyond commodities, and what structural reforms are needed to capture value rather than remain a "China+1" assembly site?

- ASEAN intra-regional trade remains stubbornly around 22–23%, compared to the European Union's roughly 60%. Beyond tariffs, what practical barriers (regulatory divergence, logistics infrastructure, payment systems, non-tariff measures) most prevent deeper regional supply chain integration in mining, energy, and processed minerals?

Moderator: Prof. Telisa Aulia Falianty, Professor of Economics, University of Indonesia

3. Third Plenary Session: Global Technology Competition, the Demographic Dividend and Cybersecurity Challenges in the Digital Economic Transformation

Speakers:

a) **Keynote:** Nezar Patria

Vice Minister of Communication and Digital of the Republic of Indonesia

“Cyber Power and Global Competition: How Small and Middle Powers Can Leverage Digital Economic Transformation”

Subtopic of discussion:

- Indonesia is among the largest digital markets in Southeast Asia by user base, yet much of the regulatory standard-setting for the digital economy is still imported rather than authored domestically. What is the Ministry's concrete strategy to convert Indonesia's market size into genuine negotiating leverage over digital economic rules, rather than remaining primarily a rule-taker?
- Cross-border data arrangements are central to digital economic transformation, but the terms are typically set by larger economies or platform companies, leaving smaller and middle powers to adopt frameworks negotiated elsewhere. What concrete mechanism is the Ministry building to ensure data governance reflects Indonesian economic interests, rather than simply accommodating terms set by others?
- Indonesia's strategy for digital economic sovereignty must navigate complex dependencies on US and Chinese cloud providers, social platforms, payment systems, and AI infrastructure. Which specific policies (data localisation for sensitive sectors, sovereign cloud infrastructure, domestic platform development, strategic procurement preferences) should Indonesia prioritise in the next three years? Which of these are practical, and which remain largely aspirational given technical and economic realities? How should Indonesia balance digital sovereignty, foreign investment in cloud and data-centre infrastructure, and the implementation of the Personal Data Protection Law?

b) Adi Darmadi

Country Manager Rockwell Automation Asia Pacific

“Technological Disruption and the Future of Labour Market”

Subtopic of discussion:

- Asia Pacific is not uniform. Japan and South Korea face severe labour shortages and need automation. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are mid-dividend, they need manufacturing employment to absorb young populations before the window closes. As a regional president deploying automation across both contexts, how does Rockwell differentiate its approach, and should it?
- Labour displacement from automation crosses borders, supply chains shift, informal workers migrate, and national reskilling programs compete rather than coordinate. What regional or multilateral mechanism for managing this transition does not currently exist but should, and what would industry need to commit to make it viable?
- In a world where manufacturing can relocate to wherever labour and regulatory costs are lowest, automation-driven displacement can simply be externalised to the next country. What prevents that race to the bottom, and is there a binding commitment company is prepared to make publicly today on labour transition responsibilities in the markets you operate in?

c) Jean-Noel Bonnieu

Vice President International Relations, Thales Group

“Future Digital Resilience in Safeguarding Critical Infrastructure and Securing Digital Economy”

Subtopic of discussion:

- The fragmentation of the global digital order into competing technological blocs, US-aligned versus China-aligned infrastructure, is simultaneously a cybersecurity risk and a geopolitical outcome. For states in Asia Pacific that depend on both ecosystems, what does credible digital resilience actually look like when the architecture itself is politically divided?
- Thales leads globally in quantum technology R&D. Are the critical systems Thales has deployed in Indonesia already being designed or upgraded for post-quantum cryptographic standards, and if not, who bears the cost and timeline of that transition when quantum-capable threat actors arrive?
- Thales has built deep roots across Indonesia's critical infrastructure, from satellite connectivity and air traffic management to digital identity and cybersecurity. Given that breadth of presence, how does Thales see its role in progressively strengthening Indonesia's indigenous digital resilience capacity, that would signal that Indonesia's critical digital infrastructure can sustain itself even when the geopolitical environment disrupts foreign vendor relationships?

d) Patrick Rudolf Dannacher

President Director and CEO of ITSEC Asia

“Ethics and Responsibility in the Use of AI”

Subtopic of discussion:

- The EU has binding AI regulation, the US relies on voluntary frameworks, China has its own state-directed model, and most of Southeast Asia has neither the capacity nor the consensus to legislate meaningfully yet. In a fragmented regulatory world, what stops AI ethics

from becoming purely a competitive advantage for the least regulated, and what multilateral mechanism is realistically enforceable?

- AI ethics frameworks are largely written by the same powers competing for AI dominance, the US, EU, and China. For countries in the Global South that are technology consumers rather than producers, adopting any of those frameworks means implicitly aligning with a geopolitical bloc. What space exists for smaller or non-aligned states to shape AI governance rather than simply receive it?
- Academics frame the principles. Diplomats negotiate the agreements. As a practitioner operating across jurisdictions in Asia, what specific policy commitment, would most concretely close the gap between AI ethics as declared and AI ethics as practiced?

Moderator: Edi Permadi, Professional Expert of Lemhannas RI

D. Date and Venue

Date : 9 July 2026
 Venue : Bidakara Hotel
 Jalan Gatot Subroto Kav 71-73 Jakarta Selatan
 Jakarta Selatan

E. Participant Target

Estimated attendance is 200 people, with the following details.

1. Representatives from the national government.
2. Representatives of foreign embassy and think tanks.
3. Experts and scholars.
4. Think-tanks and media

F. Output

The expected outcome of this forum is as follows:

1. Policy recommendations for the President of the Republic of Indonesia.
2. Seminar Proceeding.
3. Results of the Mini Survey “Forum Pulse” on Visible-Shared Regional Voice Amid Global Turbulence and a Fragmented World

G. Summary of Event

TIME	9 JULY 2026
08.00 – 09.00	Registration
09.00 – 09.20	Opening and Welcome Address Governor of the National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia
09.20 – 09.40	Keynotes – Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia Mr. Sugiono
09.40 – 09.55	Coffee Break I
10.00 – 11.30	1 st Plenary Session

10.00 - 10.15 (15 minutes) 10.15 – 10.30 (15 minutes) 10.30 – 10.45 (15 minutes) 10.45 – 11.15 (30 minutes)	“The Decline of Multilateralism in the Multipolar Era: Super Power Dominance and Challenges to International Norms” Moderator: Dr. Philips J. Vermonte Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Indonesian International Islamic University (UIII) Speakers: 1. Prof. Nick Bisley Pro Vice-Chancellor for Research and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe University 2. Prof. Dr. Georgy Toloraya National Coordinator for Council for Security Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific; Executive Director (the lead operational and research executive) of the National Committee on BRICS Research - Russia 3. Prof. Hikmahanto Juwana International Law Professor, Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia Q&A and Discussion Session
11.20 – 11.35 (15 minutes) 11.35 – 11.50 (15 minutes) 11.50 – 12.05 (15 minutes) 12.05 – 12.20 (15 minutes) 12.20 – 12.50 (30 minutes)	2nd Plenary Session “The Shift Toward Strategic Protectionism: Power Competition Across Green Energy, Financial Systems and International Trade” Special Remarks – Vice Minister of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia Dyah Roro Esti Widya Putri Moderator: Prof. Telisa Aulia Falianty Professor of Economics, University of Indonesia Speakers: 1. Shaokai Fan Head of Asia-Pacific, Global Head of Central Bank, World Gold Council 2. Arief Wijaya Managing Director World Resource Institute (WRI) Indonesia 3. Ben Lawson Energy, Mining & Business Development Expert, Vice Chairman of Djakarta Mining Club Q&A and Discussion Session
12.50-14.00	Lunch and Break Time

14.00 – 15.35	3rd Plenary Session
	“Global Technology Competition, the Demographic Dividend and Cybersecurity Challenges in the Digital Economic Transformation”
14.05 – 14.20 (15 minutes)	Special Remarks – Vice Minister of Communication and Digital of the Republic of Indonesia Nezar Patria
	Moderator: Edi Permadi Professional Expert of Lemhannas
14.20 – 14.35 (15 minutes)	Speakers: 1. Adi Darmadi Country Manager Indonesia Rockwell Automation
14.35 – 14.50 (15 minutes)	2. Jean-Noel Bonnieu Vice President International Relations, Thales Group
14.50 – 15.05 (15 minutes)	3. Patrick Rudolf Dannacher President Director of ITSEC Asia
15.05 – 15.35 (30 minutes)	Q&A and Discussion Session
15.35 – 15.45 (10 minutes)	Traditional dances and performances
15.45 - 16.00 (15 minutes)	Wrap Up – Forum Summary Acting Deputy for Strategic Studies
16.00 - 16.15 (15 minutes)	Closing Remark – Governor of the National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia
16.15	Closing Ceremony

Chairman of the Jakarta Geopolitical Forum
X/2026,



Y. Hondawantri Naibaho, S.H., M.Si., M.H.
Brigadier General of Police